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Apraxia is a well-known syndrome characterized by the sufferer’s inability to perform
routine gestures. In an attempt to understand the syndrome better, various different
theories have been developed and a number of classifications of different subtypes
have been proposed. In this article review, we will address these theories with a specific
focus on how the use of objects helps us to better understand upper limb apraxia.
With this aim, we will consider transitive vs. intransitive action dissociation as well as
less frequent types of apraxia involving objects, i.e., constructive apraxia and magnetic
apraxia. Pantomime and the imitation of objects in use are also considered with a
view to dissociating the various different components involved in upper limb apraxia.
Finally, we discuss the evidence relating to action recognition and awareness of errors
in the execution of actions. Various different components concerning the use of objects
emerge from our analysis and the results show that knowledge of an object and sensory-
motor representations are supported by other functions such as spatial and body
representations, executive functions and monitoring systems.
Keywords: objects in apraxia, action recognition, imitation and pantomime, error awareness
APRAXIA: A MULTIFACETED AND COMPLEX SYNDROME
The term Apraxia covers a wide spectrum of disorders, all referring to motor cognition and the
inability to perform actions that have been previously learned and/or were possible before the onset
of the syndrome. These deficits cannot be explained by elementary motor or sensory deficits and
are not due to language comprehension disorders (Zadikoff and Lang, 2005). Apraxia is usually the
result of left frontal and parietal lesions (prevalence ranging from 28 to 57%, Donkervoort et al.,
2000), although in some cases apraxia following right brain damage has been reported (prevalence
ranging from 0 to 34%, Donkervoort et al., 2000). In addition, lesions involving the corpus callosum
cause unilateral left apraxia. Thus, the left hemisphere appears to be dominant in processing actions
(Petreska et al., 2007).
Apraxia is characterized by an automatic—voluntary dissociation (De Renzi et al., 1982). In
other words, patients can execute spontaneous gestures when the environmental context induces
their involuntary/automatic response (e.g., waving their hand to say goodbye when they are going
away) but they are not able to intentionally execute the same action out-of-context or when asked
to do so by an experimenter. For this reason apraxia is considered as a disorder of the voluntary and
aware ability to perform gestures (Wolpe et al., 2014).
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 1 February 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 39
Canzano et al. Objects in Action Execution and Recognition
Steinthal first introduced the termApraxia (literally =without
action) in 1871 to describe the difficulty that certain patients had
when they tried to execute an action which involved an object
or a tool. He suggested that the deficit depends on disorders
in the relationship between the patients’ movements and their
abilities to manipulate objects (Steinthal, 1871, 1881). Since then,
various different forms of apraxia have been described, some
which involve objects, others which do not.
Liepmann (1920) proposed a classification of the different
subtypes of apraxia with the aim of identifying the various
motor and cognitive aspects. He identified three different
subtypes. A person who is able to name familiar tools and
objects but is almost totally unable to use them correctly
suffers from Ideational apraxia. In this case, the person has
lost the ability to conceptually organize intended actions.
Ideo-kinetic (or ideo-motor) apraxia is a disorder affecting
the production component of the praxis system, resulting
from an apparent dissociation between the idea of an
action and its execution. This also involves an inability to
pantomime actions or mimic an action with an object or
tool (without actually holding the object in question). Finally,
limb-kinetic apraxia refers to a loss of dexterity or deftness,
characterized by hesitations and a disrupted smoothness
in movements (Liepmann, 1920; cited in Goldenberg,
2013).
The cognitive nature of apraxic deficits was also discussed
by Geschwind who suggested that apraxia does not extend
to novel or meaningless movements, but exclusively concerns
learned motor skills: ‘‘the hemisphere dominant for handedness
is a storehouse of the learning involved in the acquisition of
motor skills’’ (Geschwind and Damasio, 1985, p. 191). When
this storehouse, localized in the lower left parietal area, is
damaged or disconnected from verbal and visual commands
or from the premotor cortex (Heilman et al., 1982; Petreska
et al., 2007), patients are apraxic. However, this hypothesis was
not exhaustive. Indeed, evidence of deficits in the imitation of
novel, meaningless gestures (with meaningful actions spared)
has led to the identification of a new subtype of apraxia,
the visuo-imitative apraxia (Goldenberg and Hagmann, 1997).
In this case, patients do not present with a general defect
affecting imitation but suffer from a specific deficit in the
imitation of meaningless gestures. This dissociation has been
explained by the Dual-Route Model (Gonzalez Rothi et al.,
1991) that suggests the existence of two streams involved in the
production and imitation of actions. With the direct route (or
non-lexical route), the gesture is produced by means of a direct
translation of visual input into motor outputs. This permits the
imitation of both novel, meaningless gestures and significant
and familiar actions. The alternative, semantic route (or lexical
route) needs lexical, semantic memory and is exclusively useful
for familiar and meaningful gestures (Gonzalez Rothi et al.,
1991). Thus, an interruption in the direct route does not
affect meaningful actions, but it does cause a specific disorder
affecting the selective imitation of new and meaningless gestures
(visuo-imitative apraxia). The Dual-Route Model was revised by
Cubelli et al. (2000) who added a system specifically devoted
to the direct transcoding of visual input into motor programs
(the ‘‘visuo-motor conversion mechanism’’) and a system for
short-term representation of the whole action (the ‘‘gestural
buffer’’; Figure 1).
Taking all these approaches to apraxia into account, we may
consider that both sensory–motor and cognitive components
play a role in the execution of gestures (Buxbaum et al.,
2014; Goldenberg, 2014; Osiurak and Le Gall, 2015). Using an
object or pantomiming the use of an object without a model
certainly requires the recruitment of cognitive functions such
as knowledge of the object and its function and/or the context
in which it is usually employed. Nevertheless, these need to be
integrated with motor and sensory functions (Goldenberg, 2013,
see below). Body representations may also play a crucial role.
A strong connection between gestures and the body has been
demonstrated in apraxia. Goldenberg (1995) have shown that
knowledge of one’s own body is necessary in gesture imitation.
Indeed, patients who are impaired when executing gestures
involving their own body are also impaired when reproducing
the same gestures using a manikin. This indicates a close link
between body representations and action planning. Disorders in
imaging and planning the functional relationship between body
parts and objects are also suggested by the typology of the errors
which apraxic patients frequently commit when they pantomime
transitive actions: they often use their hand as if this was the
object or a part of the object (Body part as object). Finally,
the existence of effector-specific forms of apraxia suggests a
relationship between body representations and gesture making
disorders. In fact, various different types of apraxia have been
described involving the face (upper/lower face apraxia, oral
apraxia, orofacial apraxia, apraxia of speech), the eyes (eyelid
apraxia, ocular apraxia, gaze apraxia), the limbs (hand apraxia,
finger apraxia, apraxic agraphia, dressing apraxia, magnetic
apraxia), the legs (leg apraxia, gait apraxia) and the trunk (axial
apraxia; Petreska et al., 2007). These subtypes correspond to
at least partially different lesion sites. For example, while an
impairment in the imitation of hand gestures is associated with
left inferior parietal lesions, impairments in the imitation of
finger gestures may follow both right and left pre-central and
inferior frontal lesions. Disorders in lower face movements are
a consequence of damage to the left ventral precentral frontal
gyrus, while deficits in upper face movements may follow both
left and right sided lesions (Goldenberg, 2013). In this article, the
term apraxia will refer to limb apraxia unless otherwise specified.
In general, limb apraxia is more frequent after left as compared
to right hemisphere brain damage. In addition, left hemisphere
lesions usually cause bilateral signs of apraxia, while damage to
the right hemisphere only affects the left hand (Petreska et al.,
2007).
The role of body representations in the execution of gestures
was also suggested by Buxbaum et al. (2000) in their revision
of Rothi’s model. The authors emphasized the importance of
spatial components, in particular the need for updates regarding
the reciprocal spatial dynamic positions of the body parts
in relation to an object while an action is being executed.
This stage of an action is between the lexical and non-
lexical route and subserves both meaningful and meaningless
actions.
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FIGURE 1 | Graphical representation of the “Dual-Route Model” (Gonzalez Rothi et al., 1991), with the additional proposal for the Visuomotor
Conversion System, Gestural Buffer (Cubelli et al., 2000), Functional and Manipulation Knowledge (Roy and Square, 1995) and the Selective Tactile
Route (Graham et al., 1999).
In this context, apraxia appears to be a complex, multifaceted
syndrome. In addition to specific knowledge (of an object, its
function and its relative context) and sensory-motor abilities
(the planning and execution of actions), other elements such as
body and space representations may affect the execution of a
gesture. As such, understanding the role of objects in apraxia
may help us to achieve a better understanding of the nature
of apraxia. Indeed, deficits related to the use of objects have
been recognized as the main symptom of the syndrome since
it was first identified (Steinthal, 1871) and it is this disorder
that patients complain about most. Moreover, research has
recently shown that the shape and position of objects can
activate motor responses in healthy people (affordance, Gibson,
1979; Ellis and Tucker, 2000) and that body-object interaction
may involve specific non-semantic types of knowledge (e.g.,
memory of movements, knowledge regarding manipulation,
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mechanical problem solving, action monitoring and error
awareness).
The role of objects in action execution and error recognition
is the topic of this article. We will start by describing some
types of apraxia and the main dissociation between deficits
involving the use of objects (i.e., transitive actions) and those
which do not involve objects (i.e., intransitive actions). We will
also briefly introduce two specific subtypes of apraxia that in
some way involve the incorrect use of objects: constructional
apraxia (Critchley, 1953) and magnetic apraxia (Denny-Brown,
1958). Deficits in action execution will then be analyzed
with reference to the three tasks usually administered in the
assessment of apraxia: the use of objects and the imitation
and pantomiming of actions. Finally, the potential effects of
apraxia on the recognition of actions and the role of objects
in the detection of errors in the execution of actions will be
discussed.
OBJECTS IN APRAXIA
The distinction between transitive and intransitive gestures is
based on whether or not an action involves the use of an object.
The transitive/intransitive dissociation has been documented in
several case studies reporting gesture-specific forms of apraxia
(Rapcsak et al., 1993; Dumont et al., 1999).
A transitive gesture is tool-based (e.g., hammering in a nail)
and it is in some way shaped by the nature of the object and
by any knowledge possessed regarding its functions or potential
uses. Indeed, if an object is actually present, the action may take
a third route, in addition to the two previously mentioned routes
in Rothi et al.’s (1985) model, the ‘‘selective tactile route’’. There
is evidence that this third route may be specific and crucial for
actions involving objects, which may potentially be driven by
tactile information inherent to objects (Graham et al., 1999).
The existence of this additional route seems to be confirmed
by evidence collected from a patient who was impaired when
responding to verbal or visual commands which requested him to
perform certain gestures, but who was able to execute an action
when he took hold of a tool (Buxbaum et al., 2000). In spite
of this ‘‘third route’’, accuracy in transitive gestures is usually
reported to be lower than in intransitive gestures (Haaland
and Flaherty, 1984; Gonzalez Rothi et al., 1988; Schnider et al.,
1997; Haaland et al., 2000), although apraxic patients are often
impaired in both transitive and intransitive actions. Nevertheless,
it has been suggested that symptoms affecting both hands only
affect transitive gestures, while disorders in intransitive actions
usually only involve the contralesional hand (Watson et al., 1986;
Binkofski et al., 2001).
A problematic aspect concerning the classification of
transitive actions concerns the distinction between single step
and multiple step gestures. Some authors (Heilman and Rothi,
1993; Raymer and Ochipa, 1997) have suggested a distinction
between the difficulty experienced when using a tool or object
(conceptual apraxia) and the inability to execute multistep
actions (ideational apraxia). Of course, both of these involve
the idea of an action, but in the case of ideational apraxia,
errors might be due to other than sensory-motor errors (e.g.,
step omissions or perseverance). For this reason, the definition
relating to Action Disorganization would seem to be more
appropriate (Schwartz et al., 1995; Humphreys and Forde, 1998).
Action Disorganization refers to cases where habitual actions
are performed perfectly but disturbances arise when an action
requires a preformed plan in accordance with a specific goal
(Poeck, 1983; Schwartz et al., 1993, 1995; Goldenberg et al., 2007).
In this way, we can see it is possible to distinguish between
ideational components and more executive aspects.
An important issue in the debate on transitive actions
concerns the source of the knowledge which is necessary for
the appropriate use of an object. Two types of knowledge are
considered to be necessary: knowledge regarding the features
relating to a particular tool or object (Functional Knowledge) and
knowledge of the action required for that object and of how to
organize the individual motor sequences involved in that action
(Manipulation Knowledge; Roy and Square, 1995).
Functional knowledge of tools lies in the semantic memory
(Goldenberg and Randerath, 2015) and associates various types
of tools with their purpose and the actions they can be used
for. When a tool has several possible uses, functional knowledge
is used to weigh these up based on their relative frequency
and familiarity. The prototypical use invariably predominates
(Goldenberg, 2013).
Manipulation knowledge refers to the (modality specific)
motor representations that underlie the use of familiar tools
and objects. This corresponds to the ‘‘engrams’’ or ‘‘movement
memory’’ (Heilman and Rothi, 1993) that are thought to
contain the features of gestures (i.e., muscular and joint
actions, hand postures) which are invariant and critical when
one needs to distinguish between one gesture and another
(Buxbaum, 2001). However, each action requires adaptations
of its invariant features in order to deal with changes in
environmental conditions (e.g., the position, shape or size of
an object). These engrams cannot therefore be rigid and stable.
Goldenberg (2013) suggests that this specific manipulation
knowledge is only necessary for the special, expert use of a
tool (e.g., using a hammer for sculpting, playing a violin) but
not for conventional tools. In everyday activities, manipulation
knowledge would be replaced by the interaction between general
functional knowledge and mechanical problem solving processes
(Goldenberg, 2013, p. 125). Mechanical problem solving involves
the ability to infer its function from the structure of an
object (Goldenberg and Hagmann, 1998). It refers to general
rules in the context of mechanical interactions with objects
rather than to the functional properties of an individual object.
These rules are based on the general principles of physics
and mechanics that people acquire over the course of their
lives (‘‘folk physics’’, Povinelli et al., 2000) and they apply
to concrete constellations of tools and objects. As familiar
and novel objects share a similar repertoire of functionally
significant parts and properties (e.g., a handle, a blade) and since
familiar applications of tools obey the same physical regularities,
mechanical problem solving allows the accommodation of new
objects and assists in the identification of alternative ways
of using familiar objects (e.g., a coin used as a screwdriver).
Deficits in functional knowledge lead to the defective use
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of common tools, while disorders in mechanical problem
solving impact unusual, alternative uses of familiar objects and
novel tools (Goldenberg, 2013). Of course, in both situations
components relating to knowledge about an object, sensory-
motor information and spatial and body representations are
involved. However, while people exclusively rely on previously
learned contents when using common tools, mechanical problem
solving (which is necessary for novel actions) requires the
integration of these components in a totally new way or
in a way that is only partially similar to previously used
methods. This may explain the fact that some patients can
perform habitual actions but are totally unable to use unusual
objects.
We can thus understand that when people perform new,
unusual actions, the mechanical problem solving they resort to
is based on information provided by the object they wish to
use. When people identify an object, they activate exploratory
movements to upload its tactile properties (Loeb and Fishel,
2014). ‘‘Perception is not something that happens to us or
in us: it is something we do’’ (Noe, 2004, p. 1). An elegant
exemplification of this affirmation was made by Gibson (1979)
who coined the term ‘‘affordance’’, that is, the implicit effect of
the association of an object with the various actions and functions
that it allows. Affordance depends on the setting between the
physical properties of the body and the physical features of the
environment (Warren, 1984; Adolph and Berger, 2006). Ellis and
Tucker (2000), in fact, proposed the term ‘‘micro-affordances’’
to refer to the activation of action components appropriate for
interacting with objects. The fact that body representations are
necessary has been demonstrated in studies indicating that adults
judge affordances with respect to intrinsic information about
their bodies (Warren, 1984; Mark, 1987; Warren and Whang,
1987; Mark et al., 1990). However, it is not only the perception
of affordance that guides an action: perception and actions are
in a continuous feedback loop (Patla, 1998; Adolph and Berger,
2006; Franchak et al., 2010). In addition to the pragmatic process,
which includes an analysis of the various different affordances
and potential translations into action, higher order visual areas
provide a perceptually based parallel semantic description of the
object (Jeannerod et al., 1995; Ellis and Tucker, 2000; Maranesi
et al., 2014).
Thus, using tools and grasping objects (with a configuration
of the hand in accordance with the object) are highly specialized
behaviors in primates (Jeannerod et al., 1995; Macfarlane
and Graziano, 2009; Maranesi et al., 2014) indicating that
they are able to reinterpret the physical world as a series
of abstract features (Penn et al., 2008). An inability to use
tools may thus reflect damage to the ‘‘stored representational
system of gestures’’ (Buxbaum, 2001). This system supports
representations regarding a tool (the Functional Knowledge),
its associations and the purpose of any actions performed
with it (the Manipulation Knowledge) or, as Luria (1978)
suggested, it may be the result of deficits in executive planning
(i.e., Dysexecutive syndrome). Finally, some authors attribute
difficulty in using tools to a specific problem with technical
reasoning (Gagnepain, 1990; Le Gall, 1998; Osiurak et al., 2009,
2010), including difficulties in identifying and unifying the
technical means relevant for a given technical end (Jarry et al.,
2013).
Taken as a whole, these complementary analyses of the
various processes involved in transitive actions make it possible
to identify a further component, a sort of implicit, non-
verbal, practical/technical reasoning which may or may not
be dissociable from executive functions. Although Mechanical
Problem Solving is based on all the other components (the visual
and tactile perception of objects and environments, motricity,
spatial and body representations), it is probably crucial to
understanding apraxia (Goldenberg, 2013). For example, it may
explain two well-known dissociations: the automatic/voluntary
association and the know/unknown action dissociation. Ignoring
these aspects often leads to an underestimation of any diagnosis
of apraxia in patient reports and the onset of symptoms is only
reported after the patient has been discharged from hospital.
We also wish to put forward a hypothesis suggesting errors
linked to the various components of the execution of an action
may be differently associated with Functional Knowledge or
Mechanical Problem Solving.
Several classifications of apraxic errors in the use of objects
have been suggested (De Renzi and Lucchelli, 1988; Humphreys
and Forde, 1998; Schwartz et al., 1998; Goldenberg et al., 2001;
Rumiati et al., 2001; Petreska et al., 2007). Among these, errors
due to disorders in Functional Knowledge may be Perplexity,
Conduits d’approche, Omission and Misuse (involving content,
substitutive, augmentative, fragmentary and associative errors,
Petreska et al., 2007).
Patients who show Perplexity seem to have no idea what
they can do with an object: ‘‘The patient looked hesitatingly at
the objects, picked up one of them, turned it over, put it down,
then tried with another object, giving unmistakable signs of not
knowing what to do’’ (De Renzi and Lucchelli, 1988, p. 1177).
Sometimes patients seem to try various different actions in
order to progressively reach the right one (e.g., when trying
to use a toothbrush, the patient starts hitting his/her cheek,
reaches his/her mouth and is finally able to brush his/her
teeth). These Conduits d’approches are very similar to those
of aphasic patients when speaking. Omissions may be present
in multistep actions such as when patients forget ‘‘to carry out
an action necessary for completing the sequence, for example,
the stamp was not moistened’’ (De Renzi and Lucchelli, 1988,
p. 1177) and this leads to incomplete executions. In the case
of Misuse, the object is used in a conceptually inappropriate
way or is used as if it was another object (Parapraxic errors).
Here the patient not only does not have any idea of what to
do, but seems not to realize his/her difficulty when using the
object incorrectly. Other errors indicating object misuse are the
replacement of one movement with another that shares one or
more similar features (Associative errors), the fragmentation of
gestures or the production of inappropriate steps (Augmentative
errors).
The disorders which are linked to Mechanical Problem
Solving seem to be Clumsiness, Mislocation, Sequence errors
and Perseveration. Clumsiness refers to when an action appears
to be conceptually correct for the tool but is ‘‘carried out in
an awkward and ineffectual way, because of poor control of
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skilled hand movements’’ (De Renzi and Lucchelli, 1988, p. 1177).
Mislocation is when an object is used in an appropriate way but in
a non-appropriate place. Spatial misorientation of an object or of
an object with respect to the body is also sometimes considered to
be the same type of error. When the Sequence is incorrect, part
of an action is executed without the previous step having been
completed (e.g., the envelope is sealed before the letter is placed
inside it). Finally, Perseveration refers to a situation where a
patient continues to repeat part of an action without any apparent
aim or he/she is unable to stop executing one step in order to
execute the next.
Although these errors are much more frequent in left
damaged apraxic patients, it is worth noting that very similar
errors may be also present in non apraxic patients. For example,
Mislocation and errors in Trajectory are frequent in right
hemisphere damaged people (in particular in the presence of
spatial neglect) and Perseveration and Frequency errors are a
typical index of frontal damage. Although the most part of right
hemisphere damaged patients’ errors are usually considered due
to spatial and more general attentive disorders (Goldenberg,
2013), only in depth qualitative investigation will enable a better
understanding of the various different expressions of action
errors.
CONSTRUCTIONAL APRAXIA
Constructional apraxia was defined by Benton as ‘‘the
impairment in combinatory or organizing activity in which
details must be clearly perceived and in which the relationship
among the component parts of the entity must be apprehended’’
(Benton, 1967). Although constructional apraxia is usually
assessed by means of drawing or copying tasks, this also
impacts the patient’s ability to put together the components
of an object (e.g., a coffee machine or a food mixer) with
consequences affecting everyday activities. The main cause
of this syndrome seems to involve a disorder in Mechanical
Problem Solving. Nevertheless, other action components may
impact on constructional abilities. Critchley (1953, p. 191)
described this form of apraxia in these terms: ‘‘The defects which
characterize constructional apraxia essentially involve those
movements which are directly concerned with space per se, i.e.,
manipulation of the three dimensions of space, and particularly
the translation of an object from one spatial dimension into
another’’. In fact, lesions in both the right and left hemisphere
may produce constructional apraxia, although the symptoms
are qualitatively different. After left hemisphere lesions, errors
regard the comprehension of the function of an object or its
parts, the sequence required to put together the various parts and
the organization of that sequence. Copies of drawings respects
the appropriate distance to the model and the global orientation
and outlines, although the drawing appears impoverished by
lack of or simplification of details. In contrast, in the case of
right hemisphere lesion, patients mainly commit spatial errors
regarding the positioning of the individual parts of an object
and their reciprocal relations. Copies of drawings are badly
placed and sometimes too close to the model or overlapping
(‘‘closing in’’) with a distortion of the horizontal and vertical axes
(Goldenberg, 2013). When spatial neglect is present, the parts of
the picture in the contra-lesional space are totally omitted and
the global structure is broken.
MAGNETIC APRAXIA
The compulsive tactile exploration and object grasping which
often occurs in the contra-lesional hand after left or right
frontal lobe damage is called Magnetic Apraxia (Denny-Brown,
1958; Moro et al., 2015). In this condition, the mere visual
presence of an object near the hand (or touching the hand)
triggers groping movements as well as grasping. In spite of
the fact that these movements appear to be goal directed,
they are totally involuntary and the patient is not able to
inhibit the behavior of the hand. Magnetic Apraxia is often
associated with grasping, an inability to release the grip (Forced
grasping response) and groping (i.e., movements toward a
stimulus based on the mere proximity of the stimulus and
not triggered by tactile stimulation). In addition, utilization
behavior (i.e., involuntary and inappropriate use of objects)
and the compulsive involuntary manipulation of tools may be
present. Finally, when magnetic apraxia is a symptom of the
Anarchic Hand syndrome, it may be associated with Intermanual
conflict (i.e., the hand movements interfere with non-anarchic
actions) and Diagonistic dyspraxia (i.e., uncontrolled cross-
purpose actions of the Anarchic Hand are triggered by
voluntary activities of the non-Anarchic Hand; Moro et al.,
2015).
These involuntary movements may lead one to object that
Magnetic Apraxia is not strictly a form of apraxia. In fact this is
not a disorder affecting the voluntary and aware ability to make
gestures (Wolpe et al., 2014). Nevertheless, alterations in object-
body (i.e., hand) interactions are the main symptom of Magnetic
Apraxia associated with an inability to inhibit involuntary actions
and the exacerbation of automatic responses. The result is a
dysfunctional use of objects.
IMITATION AND PANTOMIME
Despite the fact that early descriptions of limb apraxia mainly
concerned the difficulty that patients experienced in the use of
objects, assessments of apraxic symptoms are usually carried
out by means of imitation and pantomime tasks (for the object
use task, see De Renzi and Lucchelli, 1988). In imitation tasks,
subjects are asked to reproduce the actions executed by the
examiner, while in pantomime tasks they are requested to make
specific gestures on verbal or kinaesthetic command or after an
object is presented (but with the pantomime being performed
without the object).
The differences between these two types of tasks are crucial
if we wish to understand the nature of apraxia and the potential
role of objects (Goldenberg, 2013). In fact, in a seminal model
of apraxia, Roy and Hall (1992) proposed distinguishing between
two sequentially arranged phases in gesture production. In the
first phase, a mental image of the action is created using the long-
term memory (with the involvement of the Semantic Route of
Gonzalez Rothi et al., 1991). This is typical for pantomime tasks
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but not necessary for imitation tasks. In the second phase, the
image is converted into motor response programs (in addition
to all the components previously discussed). In imitation tasks,
only this second phase is necessary since an image of the action is
provided by the examiner who executes the gesture that patients
have to imitate (the Direct Route, following Gonzalez Rothi et al.,
1991). From this perspective, a deficit in imitation would always
be associated with a disorder in pantomime due to the deficit
affecting the second phase of the process which is common to
both the tasks.
The fact that a process of action goal recall is possibly
also involved in imitation tasks belies Roy and Hall’s theory.
According to the Theory of Goal-Directed Imitation (GOADI;
Wohlschläger and Bekkering, 2002), an imitator does not
necessarily need to imitate the observed movement but
can use the model as a cue to select pre-existing motor
programs. In this case, when the gesture is executed, the
motor program does or does not match the movement of
the model, but the main goal of the action is achieved
properly. The central principle of GOADI is that the selected
goals elicit the motor program with which they are most
strongly associated even though these motor programs may
not necessarily lead to matching movements (Wohlschläger
et al., 2003). In this way, the existence of two routes sustaining
imitation is postulated, one of which relies on existing motor
programs and the other that bypasses them. Only familiar
actions can use pre-existing motor programs, while new
unfamiliar gestures replicate the motor programs showed by
the model. As a result, unfamiliar actions may be more
similar to the model than familiar ones. Gravenhorst and
Walter (2009) advance the idea that an interference effect of
familiarity is modulated by perception, and that perception
is in turn modulated by habitual style. Dissociations in the
ability to imitate familiar and unfamiliar gestures are thus
possible.
To sum up, both pantomime and imitation can be performed
when action goal and motor memory recall come into play.
Nevertheless, while imitation can be also performed without
these elements, pantomime can not. Probably for this reason,
it has been suggested that the most sensitive test in order
to assess motor memory and action goal recall in apraxia is
the pantomime on verbal command task since this provides
the least cues and is almost entirely dependent on stored
learned movement representations (visuo-kinesthetic movement
engrams or praxicons, Mozaz et al., 2002). Seeing or holding a
tool, as well as observing an examiner perform a pantomime,may
provide a patient with cues, and if the movement representation
is only partially degraded, these cues may obscure the diagnosis
(Mozaz et al., 2002). In fact, as previously discussed, it has been
suggested that not only visual, but also tactile feedback about the
shape, weight and other properties of an object or tool may have
a role in eliciting correct actions. In particular, De Renzi et al.
(1982) showed that there are no differences in pantomime on
verbal command with the tool in sight, while patients improve
in the condition when, although blindfolded, they execute the
action with the tool in their hand. Nevertheless, more recent
evidence questions the possibility that tactile feedback per se
is sufficient to evoke motor programs of correct tool use, and
suggests that the facilitation is rather induced by the provision of
additional information on the structural and functional features
of the real use of the tool (Goldenberg, 2013) and all the
possibilities that the environment offers (‘‘affordance’’, Gibson,
1979). The ‘‘creation of pantomimes requires transformation
of knowledge about the tool and its manipulation into empty-
handed gestures that communicate the identity of the tool and the
manner of its manipulation to other persons’’ (Goldenberg, 2013,
p. 155).
A qualitative analysis of the errors which occur in the
pantomime of transitive gestures is particularly interesting as it
provides evidence of a distortion in the body-object relationship.
In fact, gestures may be correct in terms of the identification of
the tool and the action, but patients fail because they use a body
part as if it was the object (Body part as object, Goodglass and
Kaplan, 1963) or demonstrate the shape of the object rather than
pantomime its use (Goldenberg, 2013).
In their analysis of errors, Buxbaum et al. (2000) consider
four components of gesture imitation and pantomime. These are:
(i) Hand Posture/Grasp—i.e., when ‘‘the hand posture/grasp is
unrecognizable, flagrantly incorrect or transiently correct; (ii) Arm
Posture/Trajectory—i.e., when ‘‘the arm posture and/or the
trajectory/shape of the movement are flagrantly incorrect or only
transiently correct’’; (iii) Amplitude of movement—i.e., when
‘‘the size of the movement is clearly too large or too small, or the
size is only transiently correct’’; and (iv) Timing/Frequency of
movement—i.e., when ‘‘the speed of the movement is flagrantly
too fast or slow and/or the number of cycles is flagrantly too few
or many’’ (Buxbaum et al., 2007, p. 423; see also Buxbaum et al.,
2000, 2005; Moro et al., 2008, 2015).
With the exception of one report (Belanger et al., 1996),
many studies have reported that patients with apraxia are more
impaired when performing transitive pantomimes (e.g., using
a knife to cut bread) than intransitive gestures (e.g., waving
goodbye; Haaland and Flaherty, 1984; Gonzalez Rothi et al.,
1988; Roy et al., 1991; Schnider et al., 1997; Foundas et al.,
1999; Haaland et al., 2000). Similar results have also been found
in healthy people (Mozaz et al., 2002; Carmo and Rumiati,
2009). Although it is possible that the movements associated with
transitive pantomimes are more complex than those involved
in intransitive gestures, differences in the frequency with which
these gestures are performed may also have a role. When people
observe other people or when they want to communicate with a
nonverbal message, they activate representations of intransitive
gestures. In contrast, people primarily use transitive postures
when they use tools or objects. A request to perform a transitive
pantomime is thus less natural than a request to make an
intransitive gesture (Mozaz et al., 2002).
At least partially different neural correlates have been
reported between pantomime and imitation. The most common
impairment after LBD involves both pantomime and imitation
in both transitive and intransitive gestures, with more deficits
for transitive than intransitive actions (Goodglass and Kaplan,
1983; Roy et al., 1993; Almeida et al., 2002; Stamenova et al.,
2010). Conversely, selective deficits in imitation have been
more frequently found after LBD for intransitive gestures.
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Disorders in imitation of of transitive gestures have been
shown also after RBD, in both acute and chronic patients
(Stamenova et al., 2010). Of course, given the role of the
right hemisphere in spatial functions, these selective deficits
may represent a secondary effect of deficits affecting the
processing of visuo-spatial information or the translation of
the spatial component of a movement into action (Roy,
1996).
Some authors have suggested that the left hemisphere may
control transitive gestures while both hemispheres may be
involved in the control of intransitive gestures (Haaland and
Flaherty, 1984; Mozaz et al., 2002; Buxbaum et al., 2007).
Nevertheless, more recent neuroimaging studies indicate that
both transitive and intransitive gesture execution activates a
common left hemisphere network involving frontal, parietal and
temporal regions (Króliczak and Frey, 2009). This does not
exclude a participation of the right hemisphere in the qualitative
features of gestures. In fact, in spite of the dominance of the
left hemisphere, the same studies have shown bilateral activation
during preparation for pantomime performance (Króliczak and
Frey, 2009) and during observation of actions (Grèzes and
Decety, 2001). This involvement of both hemispheres in the
control of movement may explain the rare cases of apraxia after
right hemisphere damage.
This analysis of studies which have specifically addressed
components of object use, pantomime and imitation has
provided evidence supporting the idea that using objects
represents a complex function involving the integration
of multiple components. A preliminary (but probably not
exhaustive) representation of these components is shown in
Figure 2.
ACTION RECOGNITION
The relationship between action execution and recognition has
for some time been a matter of debate due to the inconsistent
results from clinical and neuropsychological studies. The first
clinical report indicating that patients with focal lesions could
also have deficits in gesture recognition came at the same time
as the first description of apraxia (Finkelnburg, 1870). A century
later, in the 1980’s, a few pioneering studies on patients with limb
apraxia reported an association between the inability to perform
gestures and to understand their meaning and left parietal
lesions (Heilman et al., 1982; Rothi et al., 1985; Watson et al.,
1986). Since then, many studies have reported a co-occurrence
of the two disorders (Duffy et al., 1975; Gainotti and Lemmo,
1976; Ferro et al., 1983; Duffy and Watkins, 1984; Rothi et al.,
1985; Varney and Damasio, 1987; Wang and Goodglass, 1992;
Bell, 1994; Buxbaum et al., 2005; Pazzaglia et al., 2008b) with
the result that some authors describe ideomotor apraxia in
these terms: ‘‘These patients typically have no difficulty with
object recognition, are deficient in performing skilled actions with
objects, and even more tellingly, are impaired in recognizing
object-related actions. The impact of ideomotor apraxia clearly
extends beyond laboratory tasks. IMA patients make more errors
with implements while eating than subjects without apraxia,
and gesture recognition and tool manipulation knowledge are
strongly significant, independent predictors of sequencing errors
in multistep naturalistic action’’ (Buxbaum and Kalénine, 2010,
p. 203).
This very close link between the perceptual and the motor
components of actions finds its neuronal correlates in the
discovery of bimodal neurons and in particular of the mirror
system (Gallese et al., 1996; Fogassi et al., 2005) where neurons
are activated during both action execution and observation
(Avenanti et al., 2007; Aglioti et al., 2008; Candidi et al., 2008;
Sacheli et al., 2013; Tidoni et al., 2013; Urgesi et al., 2014). Results
from neuropsychology, neuroimaging and electrophysiological
studies based on the effects of temporary virtual lesions induced
by repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation demonstrated
that this system and in particular the inferior frontal cortex is
crucial for action understanding (Pobric and Hamilton, 2006),
pure visual discrimination of actions (Urgesi et al., 2007; Moro
et al., 2008) and imitation (Heiser et al., 2003).
Nevertheless, other studies involving a comparatively large
sample of LBD and RBD patients, reported that those with left
parietal and frontal lesions were impaired in gesture execution
but failed to show any relationship between action execution
and comprehension (Halsband et al., 2001; Negri et al., 2007).
Some evidence was found regarding gesture recognition and
the time course of a pathological process (acute vs. chronic;
Ferro et al., 1983) and regarding the type and complexity of the
gesture (Gainotti and Lemmo, 1976; Buxbaum et al., 2005). In
addition, a number of neuropsychological single-case analyses
report that the ability to imitate pantomimes is not necessary in
order to be able to recognize object-associated pantomimes and
the ability to use objects is not necessary in order to be able to
recognize objects (for a review, see Negri et al., 2007). On the
basis of these inconsistent results, it has been argued that motor
production processes associated with object use are involved but
not necessary for successful action or object recognition (Negri
et al., 2007).
The idea of a complex multi-componential network involved
in action recognition is also supported by some studies on
lesions. Recognition deficits have been found to be correlated
with both the left inferior parietal lobule (Buxbaum et al.,
2005; Tessari et al., 2007) and the opercular and triangularis
portions of the left inferior frontal gyrus (Pazzaglia et al.,
2008b). Perception of different types of gesture may engage
partially different networks. For example, Villarreal et al. (2008)
pointed out that the right pre-supplementary motor area (pre-
SMA), and bilaterally the posterior superior temporal cortex, the
posterior parietal cortex, occipito-temporal regions and visual
cortices are involved in the recognition of different types of
gesture. This suggests that selective disruptions in different parts
of the circuits may lead to distinct clinical deficits. Finally,
Pazzaglia et al. (2008a) report neuropsychological evidence
suggesting a close link between impairments in producing
actions and impairments in recognizing the sounds of actions.
The authors recruited two groups of patients (and a group
of non-apraxic patients as the control), with bucco-facial and
limb apraxia respectively. The first group was differentially
impaired in imitating actions involving the mouth, while the
other group (with limb apraxia) was differentially impaired in
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FIGURE 2 | Graphical representation of the components involved in object use.
imitating actions performed with the hand or limb (e.g., using
scissors). In a sound-picture matching task, the patients with
(selective) bucco-facial apraxia failed to recognize mouth-related
actions (e.g., slurping soup). In contrast, patients with (selective)
limb apraxia were differentially impaired in sound-picture
matching of limb-related actions. Both groups performed well
in non-human related environmental sounds (e.g., an airplane
flying).
Taken together, these results suggest that the perception,
recognition, representation and execution of actions are heavily
interactive processes in which various different features of
the action (goal, meaning, kinematics, spatial organization,
monitoring, etc.) co-operate. In this light, it might be simplistic to
consider that a single lesional locus is responsible for all possible
types of gesture recognition deficits and more in depth analyses
are necessary.
Very recently a new aspect concerning the monitoring of
action and the awareness of action-error has been investigated.
Action and error monitoring are processes which have been well
studied in the fields of psychology and neuroscience (for previous
reviews, see e.g., Bush et al., 2000; Falkenstein et al., 2000; Taylor
et al., 2007; Ullsperger et al., 2010). Specific but widespread brain
areas are involved: the anterior insula, the anterior cingulate,
the supplementary motor area, the thalamus, the brainstem,
and the parietal lobe (Harsay et al., 2012). Electrophysiological
and functional MRI studies have shown that our errors are
processed as errors by the brain even if we are unaware of
making them (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Endrass et al., 2005,
2007; O’Connell et al., 2007, 2009; Pavone et al., 2009; Shalgi
et al., 2009; Dhar et al., 2011; Hughes and Yeung, 2011).
In particular, the anterior-cingulate region has been found to
be associated with the generation of an electrophysiological
pattern, Error-Related Negativity (ERN; Dehaene et al., 1994;
Brázdil et al., 2002; Debener et al., 2005; Hester et al., 2005;
Klein et al., 2007) that does not reveal any differences between
aware and unaware errors (see also Stemmer et al., 2004).
Nevertheless, awareness of errors is associated with larger
bilateral activation of the prefrontal and parietal regions (Hester
et al., 2005) or with left anterior insula activity (Klein et al.,
2007).
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When patients are able to identify and judge errors made
by other people, but cannot recognize their own errors, they
are considered to be affected by Anosognosia. Anosognosia can
be defined as the impaired ability to recognize the presence
of deficits in sensory, perceptual, motor, affective, or cognitive
functioning or to appreciate their severity (Babinski, 1914; for a
review, see Prigatano, 2010).
Among the various different types of anosognosia, the one
which has been most investigated and is the most involved
in action recognition is Anosognosia for Hemiplegia. In this
condition, patients declare that they are able to execute actions
with their paralyzed hand, to walk and to have an unrealistic
degree of autonomy in daily life activities (Vocat et al., 2010;
Moro et al., 2011). It has been suggested that this syndrome
results from a combination of cognitive and sensorimotor
dysfunctions, including impairments in the action monitoring
system and in the detection of any mismatch between intention
and outcome (Gandola et al., 2014; Preston and Newport, 2014).
In fact, when forced to recognize their errors, at least some
anosognosic patients improve their awareness (Fotopoulou et al.,
2009; Besharati et al., 2015; Moro et al., 2015).
Although usually reported after right hemisphere damage,
anosognosia for hemiplegia may also occur after left hemisphere
lesion (Della Sala et al., 2009). So, the question is now whether a
deficit in awareness may (or may not) exist in patients affected by
apraxia and if so, how to distinguish it from a disorder in error
monitoring.
In a recent study carried out by our group (Canzano et al.,
2014), the first evidence for anosognosia in patients suffering
from bucco-facial apraxia was found. Awareness deficits were
considered to be present when patients showed that they were
able to correctly evaluate the actions and errors made by other
people but scored their own incorrect actions as being correct.
This happened both in on-line judgement (i.e., at the moment
of execution) and in off-line judgement, when patients watched
themselves executing actions in a previously recorded video clip.
In fact, in contrast with the ameliorative effects described in
patients affected by Anosognosia for Hemiplegia (Fotopoulou
et al., 2009; Besharati et al., 2015), self-observation by means
of the video did not seem to impact the patient’s awareness
of apraxic deficits. Previous studies have demonstrated deficits
in action recognition in apraxic patients (Duffy et al., 1975;
Gainotti and Lemmo, 1976; Ferro et al., 1983; Duffy and
Watkins, 1984; Rothi et al., 1985; Varney and Damasio, 1987;
Wang and Goodglass, 1992; Bell, 1994; Buxbaum et al., 2005;
Pazzaglia et al., 2008a,b; Buxbaum and Kalénine, 2010).
Nevertheless, this type of deficit was excluded in Canzano et al.’s
(2014) study as a result of the patients’ spared ability to judge the
actions of other people. The impact of these results is of course to
date limited due to the low number of patients studied.Moreover,
the results are currently limited to bucco-facial apraxia and
would need to be verified for limb apraxia.
However, the evidence of a co-occurrence of deficits involving
gesture execution and error recognition or awareness indicates
that a specific system of action monitoring is involved in action.
Although the results are only preliminary, since the potential
experimental and clinical implications are significant, action
recognition and error monitoring require in the future more in
depth investigation.
CONCLUSION
In this review, we have taken into account a good deal of recent
evidence on the subject of the interaction between objects, body
parts and the environment and have thus been able to use
our findings to emphasize the important role that tools and
objects play in the perception, understanding and production
of actions. We suggest that the use of objects is the result of a
multifaceted process where multiple components are involved.
These include not only knowledge about an object and sensory-
motor representations, but also spatial and body representations
and executive functions. In addition, a specific system devoted
to the monitoring of actions is probably necessary in order to
check performance. Many questions remain unresolved, such as
the role of the right hemisphere in apraxia and the importance
of action monitoring system in awareness of errors. These issues
need further in depth investigation in order to understand their
potential impact in the definition of new models of motor
controls and in the devising of new rehabilitative techniques.
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